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Connectivity and Equilibrium in Random Games
Abstract
We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash
equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash
equilibria arising when random utility tables are assigned to the players. We provide conditions for the
structure of the graph under which equilibria are likely to exist and complementary conditions which make
the existence of equilibria highly unlikely. Our results have immediate implications for many deterministic
graphs and generalize known results for random games on the complete graph. In particular, our results
imply that the probability that bounded degree graphs have pure Nash equilibria is exponentially small in
the size of the graph and yield a simple algorithm that finds small nonexistence certificates for a large
family of graphs. Then we show that in any strongly connected graph of n vertices with expansion
(1+Ω(1))log2(n) the distribution of the number of equilibria approaches the Poisson distribution with
parameter 1, asymptotically as n→+∞.
In order to obtain a refined characterization of the degree of connectivity associated with the existence of
equilibria, we also study the model in the random graph setting. In particular, we look at the case where
the interaction graph is drawn from the Erdős–Rényi, G(n, p), model where each edge is present
independently with probability p. For this model we establish a double phase transition for the existence
of pure Nash equilibria as a function of the average degree pn, consistent with the nonmonotone behavior
of the model. We show that when the average degree satisfies np>(2+Ω(1))loge(n), the number of pure
Nash equilibria follows a Poisson distribution with parameter 1, asymptotically as n→∞. When
1/n≪np<(0.5−Ω(1))loge(n), pure Nash equilibria fail to exist with high probability. Finally, when np=O(1/n)
a pure Nash equilibrium exists with constant probability.
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CONNECTIVITY AND EQUILIBRIUM IN RANDOM GAMES
B Y C ONSTANTINOS DASKALAKIS1 , A LEXANDROS G. D IMAKIS2
AND E LCHANAN M OSSEL 3
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Southern California,
Los Angeles and University of California, Berkeley
We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the
existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph,
we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random utility tables are assigned to the players. We provide conditions for the
structure of the graph under which equilibria are likely to exist and complementary conditions which make the existence of equilibria highly unlikely.
Our results have immediate implications for many deterministic graphs and
generalize known results for random games on the complete graph. In particular, our results imply that the probability that bounded degree graphs have
pure Nash equilibria is exponentially small in the size of the graph and yield a
simple algorithm that finds small nonexistence certificates for a large family
of graphs. Then we show that in any strongly connected graph of n vertices
with expansion (1 + (1)) log2 (n) the distribution of the number of equilibria approaches the Poisson distribution with parameter 1, asymptotically as
n → +∞.
In order to obtain a refined characterization of the degree of connectivity associated with the existence of equilibria, we also study the model in
the random graph setting. In particular, we look at the case where the interaction graph is drawn from the Erdős–Rényi, G(n, p), model where each
edge is present independently with probability p. For this model we establish a double phase transition for the existence of pure Nash equilibria
as a function of the average degree pn, consistent with the nonmonotone
behavior of the model. We show that when the average degree satisfies
np > (2 + (1)) loge (n), the number of pure Nash equilibria follows a
Poisson distribution with parameter 1, asymptotically as n → ∞. When
1/n  np < (0.5 − (1)) loge (n), pure Nash equilibria fail to exist with
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high probability. Finally, when np = O(1/n) a pure Nash equilibrium exists
with constant probability.

1. Introduction. In recent years there has been a convergence of ideas from
computer science and the social sciences aiming to model and analyze large complex networks such as the web graph, social networks and recommendation systems. From the computational perspective, it has been recognized that the successful design of algorithms performed on such networks, including routing, ranking
and recommendation algorithms, must take into account the social dynamics and
economic incentives as well as the technical properties that govern these networks
[20, 24, 27].
Game theory has been very successful in modeling strategic behavior in large
systems of economically incentivized entities. In the context of routing, for instance, it has been employed to study the effect of selfishness on the efficiency of
a network, whereby the performance of the network at equilibrium is compared to
the performance when a central authority can simply dictate a solution [7, 29, 31,
32]. The effect of selfishness has been studied in several other settings, for example, load balancing [8, 9, 21, 30], facility location [34] and network design [3].
A simple way to model interactions between agents in a large network is with a
graphical game [19]: a graph G = (V , E) is defined whose vertices represent the
players of the game, and an edge (v, w) ∈ E corresponds to the strategic interaction between players v and w; each player v ∈ V has a finite set of strategies Sv ,
which throughout this paper will be assumed to be binary so that there are two possible strategies for each player. A utility, or payoff, table uv for player v assigns a
real number uv (σv , σN (v) ) to every selection of strategies by player v and the players in v’s neighborhood, that is, the set of nodes v  such that (v, v  ) ∈ E, denoted
by N (v). A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of the game is some state, or strategy
profile, σ of the game, assigning to every player v a single strategy σv ∈ Sv , such
that no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate. Equivalently, for every player
v ∈V,
(1)







uv σv , σN (v) ≥ uv σv , σN (v)



for every strategy σv ∈ Sv .

When condition (1) is satisfied, we say that the strategy σv is a best response to the
strategies σN (v) .
The concept of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is more compelling, decision
theoretically, than the concept of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, its counterpart that allows players to choose distributions over their strategy sets. This is
because it is not always meaningful in applications to assume that the players of
a game may adopt randomized strategies. Unfortunately, unlike mixed Nash equilibria, PNE do not always exist. It is then an important problem to study how the
existence of PNE depends on the properties of the game.
The focus of this paper is to understand how the connectivity of the underlying graph affects the existence of a PNE. We obtain two kinds of results. The first
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concerns the existence of a PNE in an ensemble of random graphical games defined on a random, G(n, p), graph. We obtain a characterization of the probability
that a PNE exists as a function of the density of the graph. The second set of results concerns random graphical games on deterministic graphs. Here, we obtain
conditions on the structure of the graph under which a PNE does not exist with
high probability, suggesting also an efficient algorithm for finding witnesses of the
nonexistence of a PNE. We also give complementary conditions on the structure
of the graph under which a PNE exists with constant probability. Our results are
described in detail in Section 1.3.
Comparison to typical constraint satisfaction problems. Graphical games provide a more compact way of representing large networks of interacting agents than
normal form games, in which the game is described as if it were played on the complete graph. Besides the compact description, one of the motivations for the Introduction of graphical games is their intuitive affinity to graphical statistical models;
indeed, several algorithms for graphical games do have the flavor of algorithms for
solving Bayes nets or constraint satisfaction problems [10, 13, 16, 22, 23].
In the other direction, the notion of a PNE provides a new genre of constraint
satisfaction problems; notably one in which, for any assignment of strategies (values) to the neighborhood of a player (variable), there is always a strategy (value)
for that player which makes the constraint (1) corresponding to that player satisfied
(i.e., being in best response). The reason why it might be hard to satisfy simultaneously the constraints corresponding to all players is the long-range correlations
that may arise between players. Indeed, deciding whether a PNE exists is NP-hard,
even for very sparse graphical games [16].
Viewed as a constraint satisfaction problem, the problem of the existence of
PNE poses interesting challenges. First, for natural random ensembles over payoff
tables such as the one adopted in this paper (see Definition 1.2), the expected number of PNE is 1 for any graph [this is shown for our model in the main body of the
paper; see (10)]. On the contrary, for typical constraint satisfaction problems, the
expected number of solutions is exponential in the size of the graph with different
exponents corresponding to different density parameters. Second, unlike typical
constraint satisfaction problems studied before, the existence of PNE is a priori
not a monotone property of the connectivity. It is surprising that given these novel
features of the problem it is possible to obtain a result establishing a double phase
transition on the existence of PNE as described below.
1.1. Our model. We define the notion of a graphical game and proceed to
describe the ensemble of random graphical games studied in this paper.
D EFINITION 1.1 (Graphical game). Given a graph G = (V , E), we define the
neighborhood of node v ∈ V to be the set N (v) = {v  |(v, v  ) ∈ E}. If Sv is a set
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associated with vertex v, for all v ∈ V , we denote by SN (v) := v  ∈N (v) Sv  the
Cartesian product of the sets associated with the nodes in v’s neighborhood.
A graphical game on G is a collection (Sv , uv )v∈V , where Sv is the strategy
set of node v and uv : Sv × SN (v) → R the utility (or payoff ) function (or table) of
player v. We also define the best response function (or table) of player v to be the
function BRv : Sv × SN (v) → {0, 1} such that




BRv σv , σN (v) = 1

⇔







σv ∈ argx max uv x, σN (v) ,

for all σv ∈ Sv and σN (v) ∈ SN (v) .
D EFINITION 1.2 (Random graphical games on a fixed graph). Given a graph
G = (V , E) and an atomless distribution F over R, the probability distribution
DG,F over graphical games (Sv , uv )v∈V on G is defined as follows:
• Sv = {0, 1}, for all v ∈ V ;
• the payoff values {uv (σv , σN (v) )}v∈V ,σv ∈Sv ,σN (v) ∈SN (v) are mutually independent
and identically distributed according to F .
R EMARK 1.3 (Invariance under payoff distributions). It is easy to see that the
existence of a PNE is only determined by the best response tables of the game; see
condition (1). In particular, given that the distributions considered in this paper are
atomless, we can study PNE under DG,F , for any atomless F , by restricting our
attention (up to probability 0 events) to the measure DG over best response tables,
defined as follows:
• {BRv (0, σN (v) )}v∈V ,σN (v) ∈SN (v) are mutually independent and uniform in {0, 1};
• BRv (1, σN (v) ) = 1 − BRv (0, σN (v) ), for all σN (v) ∈ SN (v) .
We will sometimes refer to a graphical game defined in terms of its best response
tables as an underspecified graphical game. Other times, we will overload our
terminology and just call it a graphical game. We use PG [·] and EG [·] to denote
probabilities of events and expectations, respectively, under the measure DG .
R EMARK 1.4 (Invariance under payoff distributions II). Given our observation in Remark 1.3, it follows that it is not important to use a common distribution
F for sampling the payoffs of all the players of the game. All our results in this
work are true if different players have different distributions as long as these distributions are atomless and all payoffs values are sampled independently.
Extending the model to random graphs. One of the goals of this paper is to
investigate what average degree is required in a graph for a graphical game played
on this graph to have a PNE. To study this question, it is natural to consider families
of graphs with different densities and relate the probability of PNE existence with
the density of the graph. We consider graphical games on graphs drawn from the
Erdős–Rényi, G(n, p), model, with varying values of the edge probability p. The
ensemble of graphical games we consider is formally the following.
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D EFINITION 1.5. Given n ∈ N, p ∈ [0, 1] and an atomless distribution F
over R, we define a measure D(n,p,F ) over graphical games. A graphical game
is drawn from D(n,p,F ) as follows:
• a graph G is drawn from G(n, p);
• a random graphical game is drawn from DG,F .
R EMARK 1.6 (Invariance under payoff distributions III). Given our discussion
in Remark 1.3, it follows that in order to study PNE in the random ensemble of
Definition 1.5, it is sufficient to consider a measure that fixes only the best response
tables of the players in the sampled games.
For a given n ∈ N and p ∈ [0, 1], we define the measure D(n,p) over underspecified graphical games. An underspecified graphical game is drawn from D(n,p) as
follows:
• a graph G is drawn from G(n, p);
• a random underspecified graphical game is drawn from DG .
We use P(n,p) [·] to denote probabilities of events under the measure D(n,p) and
PG [·] for probabilities of events measurable under G(n, p).
In the model defined in Definition 1.5 and Remark 1.6, there are two sources
of randomness: the selection of the graph, determining what players interact with
each other, and the selection of the payoff tables. Note that in the two-stage process
that samples a graphical game from our distribution, the payoff tables can only be
realized once the graph is fixed. This justifies the subscript G in the measure DG
defined above.
1.2. Discussion.
Nonmonotonicity. Observe that the existence of a PNE is a nonmonotone property of p: any graphical game on the empty graph has a PNE for trivial reasons;
on the complete graph a random graphical game has a PNE with asymptotic probability 1 − 1e (see [12, 28]); but our results indicate that, when p is in some intermediate regime, a PNE does not exist with probability approaching 1 as n → +∞
(see Theorem 1.10).
The nonmonotonicity in the average degree of the existence of a PNE makes the
relation between PNE and connectivity nonobvious. Surprisingly, we show (Theorem 1.9) that the convergence to a Poisson distribution of the distribution of the
number of PNE in complete graphs [26, 33] extends to much sparser graphs, as
long as the average degree is at least logarithmic in the number of players. If the
sparsity increases further, we show (Theorem 1.10) that a PNE does not exist with
high probability, while if the graph is essentially empty, PNE exist with probability 1 (Theorem 1.11). Our results establish a double phase transition consistent
with the nonmonotonicity of the model.
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Methodological challenges. Our study here is an instance of studying the satisfiability of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). The generic question is to
investigate the effect of the structure of the constraint graph on the satisfiability
of the problems defined on that graph, as well as their computational complexity.
In the context of CNF formulas (corresponding to the satisfiability problem) the
graph property most commonly studied in the literature is the density of the hypergraph that contains an edge for each clause of the formula (see, e.g., [14]). In other
settings, different structural properties of the constraint graph are relevant, for example, measures of cyclicity of the graph [6, 17]. In our case, studying the average
degree reveals an interesting, nonmonotonic behavior of the model, as described
above.
In a typical CSP, to show that a solution does not exist one either uses the first
moment method to exhibit that the expected number of solutions is tiny [2], or finds
a witness of unsatisfiability that exists with high probability. To show that a satisfying assignment does exist it is quite common to use the second moment method
or its refinements, which have provided some of the best bounds for satisfiability
to date [1]. In our model the expected number of satisfying assignments turns out
to be 1 for any graph [see (10) below]. This suggests that the analysis of the problem should be harder, since in particular we cannot use the first moment method
to establish the nonexistence of a PNE. Our proof of the nonexistence of PNE
(Theorems 1.10 and 1.16) uses succinct nonexistence witnesses that appear with
high probability in sufficiently sparse graphs. These witnesses are specific subgame structures that do not possess a PNE with high probability. To establish the
existence of a PNE for sufficiently large densities (Theorems 1.9 and 1.13) we use
the second moment method. Further, we use Stein’s [4] method to establish that
the distribution of the number of PNE converges asymptotically to a Poisson(1)
distribution in this case.
1.3. Outline of main results. We describe first our results for random graphs
(for the measure D(n,p) defined in Remark 1.6), and proceed with our results for
deterministic graphs (for the measure DG defined in Remark 1.3).
PNE on random graphs. We study how the connectivity probability p influences the existence of PNE for games sampled from D(n,p) . The transition is described by the following theorems applying to different levels of graph connectivity. Before stating the theorems, we introduce some notation.
R EMARK 1.7 (Order notation). Let f (x) and g(x) be two functions defined
on some subset of the real numbers. One writes f (x) = O(g(x)) if and only if,
for sufficiently large values of x, f (x) is at most a constant times g(x) in absolute
value. That is, f (x) = O(g(x)) if and only if there exists a positive real number
M and a real number x0 such that
|f (x)| ≤ M|g(x)|

for all x > x0 .
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Similarly, we write f (x) = (g(x)) if and only if there exists a positive real number M and a real number x0 such that
|f (x)| ≥ M|g(x)|

for all x > x0 .

We casually use the order notation O(·) and (·) throughout the paper. Whenever we use O(f (n)) or (f (n)) in some bound, there exists a constant c > 0
such that the bound holds true for sufficiently large n if we replace the O(f (n)) or
(f (n)) in the bound by c · f (n).
R EMARK 1.8 (Order notation continued). If g(n) is a function of n ∈ N, then
we denote by ω(g(n)) any function f (n) such that f (n)/g(n) → +∞, as n →
+∞; similarly, we denote by o(g(n)) any function f (n) such that f (n)/g(n) → 0,
as n → +∞. Finally, for two functions f (n) and g(n), we write f (n)
g(n)
whenever f (n) = ω(g(n)).
T HEOREM 1.9 (High connectivity). Let Z denote the number of PNE in a
(2+ε) loge (n)
, ε = ε(n) > 0. For
graphical game sampled from D(n,p) , where p =
n
an arbitrary constant c > 0 we assume that ε(n) > c and (in order for p ≤ 1)
ε(n) ≤ logn(n) − 2.
e
Under the above assumptions, for all finite n, with probability at least 1 −
2n−ε/8 over the random graph sampled from G(n, p), it holds that the total variation distance between Z and a Poisson(1) r.v. W is bounded by
Z − W ≤ O(n−ε/8 ) + exp(−(n)).

(2)
In other words,
(3)

PG [ Z − W ≤ O(n−ε/8 ) + exp(−(n))] ≥ 1 − 2n−ε/8 .

In particular, the distribution of Z converges in total variation distance to a
Poisson(1) distribution, as n → +∞.
[Note that the two terms on the right-hand side of (2) can be of the same order
when ε is of the order of n/ loge (n).]
T HEOREM 1.10 (Medium connectivity). For all p = p(n) ≤ 1/n, if a graphical game is sampled from D(n,p) , the probability that a PNE exists is bounded
by
exp(−(n2 p)).
For p(n) = g(n)/n, where loge (n)/2 > g(n) > 1, the probability that a PNE exists
is bounded by






exp − eloge (n)−2g(n) .
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In particular, the probability that a PNE exists goes to 0 as n → +∞ for all p =
p(n) satisfying

 loge (n)
1
 p < 0.5 − ε  (n)
,
2
n
n
where ε (n) = ω( log1(n) ).
e

T HEOREM 1.11 (Low connectivity). For every constant c > 0, if a graphical
game is sampled from D(n,p) with p ≤ nc2 , the probability that a PNE exists is at
least


c n(n−1)/2
1− 2
−→ e−c/2 .
n
Note that our upper and lower bounds for G(n, p) leave a small gap, between
0.5 loge (n)
2 loge (n)
and p ≈
. The behavior of the number of PNE in this range
p≈
n
n
of p remains open. We establish the nonexistence of PNE for medium connectivity
graphs via a simple structure that prevents PNE from arising, called the “indifferent
matching pennies game” (see Definition 1.18 below). It is natural to ask whether
our “indifferent matching pennies” witnesses are (similarly to isolated vertices in
connectivity) the smallest structures that prevent the existence of PNE and the last
ones to disappear.
General graphs. We give conditions on the structure of a graph implying the
(likely) existence or nonexistence of a PNE in a random game played on that graph.
The existence of a PNE is guaranteed by sufficient connectivity of the underlying graph. The connectivity that we require is captured by the notion of (α, δ)expansion given next.
D EFINITION 1.12 [(α, δ)-expansion]. A graph G = (V , E) has (α, δ)-expansion iff every set V  such that |V  | ≤ δ|V | has |N (V  )| ≥ min(|V |, α|V  |) neighbors. Here we let
N (V  ) = {w ∈ V : ∃u ∈ V  with (u, w) ∈ E}.

[Note in particular that N (V  ) may intersect V  .]
We show the following result.
T HEOREM 1.13 (Strongly connected graphs). Let Z denote the number of
PNE in a graphical game sampled from DG , where G is a graph on n vertices
that has (α, δ)-expansion with α = (1 + ε) log2 (n), δ = α1 and ε > 0. Then the
total variation distance between the distribution of Z and the distribution of a
Poisson(1) r.v. W is bounded by
(4)

Z − W ≤ O(n−ε ) + O(2−n/2 ).
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Next we provide a complementary condition for the nonexistence of PNE. The
condition will be given in terms of the following structure.
D EFINITION 1.14 (d-bounded edge). An edge e = (u, v) ∈ E of a graph
G(V , E) is called d-bounded if both u and v have degrees smaller or equal to d.
We bound the probability that a PNE exists in a game sampled from DG as
a function of the number of d-bounded edges in G. For the stronger version of
our theorem, we also need the notion of a maximal weighted independent edge-set
defined next.
D EFINITION 1.15 (Maximal weighted independent edge-set). Given a graph
G(V , E), a subset E ⊆ E of the edges is called independent if no pair of edges in
E are adjacent.
If w : E → R is a function assigning weights to the edges of G,
we extend w to

subsets of edges by assigning to each E ⊆ E the weight wE = e∈E w(e). Then
we call a subset E ⊆ E of edges a maximal weighted independent edge-set if E is
an independent edge-set with maximal weight among independent edge-sets.
T HEOREM 1.16. A random game sampled from DG , where G is a graph with
at least m vertex disjoint d-bounded edges, has no PNE with probability at least


 1 22d−2 

1 − exp −m

(5)

8

.

In particular, if G has at least m edges that are d-bounded, then a game sampled
from DG has no PNE with probability at least


 22d−2 

m 1
1 − exp −
2d 8

(6)

.

Moreover, there exists an algorithm of complexity O(n2 + m2d+2 ) for proving
that a PNE does not exist, which has success probability given by (5) and (6),
respectively.
More generally, let us assign to every edge (u, v) ∈ E the weight




w(u,v) := − loge 1 − p(u,v) ,
du +dv −2

for p(u,v) = 8−2
, where du and dv are, respectively, the degrees of u and v.
Given these weights, suppose that E is a maximal weighted independent edge-set
with value wE . Then the probability that there exists no PNE is at least
1 − exp(−wE ).
An easy consequence of this result is that many sparse graphs, such as the line
and the grid, do not have a PNE with probability tending to 1 as the number of
players increases.
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The proof of Theorem 1.16 is based on a small witness for the nonexistence
of PNE, called the indifferent matching pennies game. As the name implies, this
game is inspired by the simple matching pennies game. Both games are described
next.
D EFINITION 1.17 (The matching pennies game). We say that two players a
and b play the matching pennies game if their payoff matrices are the following,
up to permuting the players’ names.
Payoff table of player a:
b plays 0 b plays 1
a plays 0
1
0
0
1
a plays 1

Payoff table of player b:
b plays 0 b plays 1
a plays 0
0
1
1
0
a plays 1

D EFINITION 1.18 (The indifferent matching pennies game). We say that two
players a and b that are adjacent to each other in a graphical game play the indifferent matching pennies game if, for all strategy profiles σN (a)∪N (b)\{a,b} in the
neighborhood of a and b, the players a and b play a matching pennies game against
each other.
In other words, for all fixed σ := σN (a)∪N (b)\{a,b} , the payoff tables of a and b
projected on σN (a)\{b} and σN (b)\{a} , respectively, are the following, up to permuting the players’ names.

a plays 0
a plays 1

b plays 0
b plays 1

Payoffs to player a:
b plays 0, other neighbors b plays 1, other neighbors
play σN (a)\{b}
play σN (a)\{b}
1
0
0
1
Payoffs to player b:
a plays 0, other neighbors a plays 1, other neighbors
play σN (b)\{a}
play σN (b)\{a}
0
1
1
0

Observe that if a graphical game contains an edge (u, v) so that players u and v
play the indifferent matching pennies game, then the game has no PNE. In particular, the indifferent matching pennies game provides a small witness for the nonexistence of a PNE, which is a coNP-complete problem for bounded degree graphical
games [16]. Our analysis implies that, with high probability over bounded degree
graphical games, there are short proofs for the nonexistence of PNE which can be
found efficiently. A related analysis and randomized algorithm was introduced for
mixed Nash equilibria in two-player games by Bárány, Vempala and Vetta [5].
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1.4. Related work. The number of PNE in random games with i.i.d. payoffs
has been extensively studied in the literature prior to our work: Goldberg, Goldman
and Newman [15] characterize the probability that a two-player random game with
i.i.d. payoff tables has a PNE, as the number of strategies tends to infinity. Dresher
[12] and Papavassilopoulos [25] generalize this result to n-player random games
on the complete graph. Powers [26] and Stanford [33] generalize the result further, showing that the distribution of the number of PNE approaches a Poisson(1)
distribution as the number of strategies increases. Finally, Rinott and Scarsini [28]
investigate the asymptotic distribution of PNE for a more general ensemble of
random games on the complete graph where there are positive or negative dependencies among the players’ payoffs.
Our work generalizes the above results for i.i.d. payoffs beyond the complete
graph to random graphical games on random graphs and several families of deterministic graphs. Parallel to our work, Dilkina, Gomes and Sabharwal [11] studied the existence of PNE in certain families of deterministic graphs, and Hart,
Rinott and Weiss [18] obtained results for evolutionarily stable strategies in random games. These results are related but not directly comparable to our results.
2. Random graphs.
2.1. High connectivity. In this section we study the number of PNE in graphical games sampled from D(n,p) . We show that, when the average degree is
pn = (2 + ε(n)) loge (n), where ε(n) > c and c > 0 is any fixed constant, the distribution of the number of PNE converges to a Poisson(1) random variable, as n goes
to infinity. This implies in particular that a PNE exists with probability converging
to 1 − 1e as the size of the network increases.
As in the study of the complete graph in [28], we use the following result of
Arratia, Goldstein and Gordon [4], established using Stein’s method. For two random variables Z, Z  supported on 0, 1, . . . we define their total variation distance
Z − Z  as


Z − Z :=

∞

|Z(i) − Z  (i)|.

i=0

L EMMA 2.1 [4]. Consider arbitrary Bernoulli random variables Xi , i =
0, . . . , N . For each i, define some neighborhood of dependence Bi of Xi such that
Bi satisfies that (Xj : j ∈ Bic ) are independent of Xi . Let
N

(7)

Z=

Xi ,

λ = E[Z],

i=0

and assume that λ > 0. Also, let
N

b1 =

P[Xi = 1]P[Xj = 1]
i=0 j ∈Bi
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and
N

b2 =

P[Xi = 1, Xj = 1].
i=0 j ∈Bi \{i}

Then the total variation distance between the distribution of Z and a Poisson random variable Wλ with mean λ is bounded by
(8)

Z − Wλ ≤ 2(b1 + b2 ).

P ROOF OF T HEOREM 1.9. For ease of notation, we identify the players of the
graphical game with the indices 1, 2, . . . , n. We also identify pure strategy profiles
with the integers in {0, . . . , 2n − 1}, mapping each integer to a strategy profile. The
mapping is defined so that, if the binary expansion of i is i(1) · · · i(n), player k
plays i(k).
Next, to each strategy profile i ∈ {0, . . . , N}, where N = 2n − 1, we assign an
indicator random variable Xi which is 1 if the strategy profile i is a PNE. Then the
counting random variable
N

(9)

Z=

Xi
i=0

corresponds to the number of PNE. Hence the existence of a PNE is equivalent to
the random variable Z being positive.
Let us condition on a realization of the graph G of the graphical game, but
not its best response tables. For a given strategy profile i, each player is in best
response with probability 1/2 over the selection of her best response table4 ; therefore EG [Xi ] = 2−n , for all i, where we recall that EG denotes expectation under
the measure DG . Hence, conditioning on G the expected number of PNE is
(10)

EG [Z] = 1.

Since this holds for any realization of the graph G it follows that E[Z] = 1.
In Lemma 2.2 that follows, we characterize the neighborhood of dependence Bi
of the variable Xi in order to be able to apply Lemma 2.1 on the collection of variables X0 , . . . , XN . Note that this neighborhood depends on the graph realization,
but is independent of the realization of the payoff tables.
L EMMA 2.2. For a fixed graph G, we can choose the neighborhoods of dependence for the random variables X0 , . . . , XN as follows:
B0 = {j : ∃k such that ∀k  with (k, k  ) ∈ E(G) it holds that j (k  ) = 0}
4 This follows directly from our model (Remark 1.6), following our assumption of atomless payoff
distributions (Definition 1.5).
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and
Bi = i ⊕ B0 = {i ⊕ j : j ∈ B0 },
where i ⊕ j = (i(1) ⊕ j (1), . . . , i(n) ⊕ j (n)) and ⊕ is the exclusive or operation.
R EMARK 2.3. Intuitively, when the graph G is realized, the neighborhood of
dependence of the strategy profile 0 (variable X0 ) contains all strategy profiles j
(variables Xj ) assigning 0 to all the neighbors of at least one player k. If such a
player k exists, then whether 0 or j (k) is a best response to the all-0 neighborhood
are dependent random variables (over the selection of the best response table of
player k). The definition of Bi in terms of B0 is justified by the symmetry of our
model.
P ROOF OF L EMMA 2.2. By symmetry, it is enough to show that X0 is inde/ B0 . Observe that in i, each player k of the game
pendent of {Xi }i ∈B
/ 0 . Fix some i ∈

has at least one neighbor k playing strategy 1. By the definition of measure DG , it
follows that whether strategy 0 is a best response for player k in strategy profile 0
is independent of whether strategy i(k) is a best response for player k in strategy
profile i, since these events depend on different strategy profiles of the neighbors
of k. 
Now, for a fixed graph G, the functions b1 (G) and b2 (G) (corresponding to b1
and b2 in Lemma 2.1) are well defined. We proceed to bound the expectation of
these functions over the sampling of the graph G:
N

EG [b1 (G)] = EG

PG [Xi = 1]PG [Xj = 1]
i=0 j ∈Bi

(11)

= EG

1
(N + 1)2

N

|Bi |
i=0

EG [|B0 |]
;
=
N +1
N

EG [b2 (G)] = EG
(12)

PG [Xi = 1, Xj = 1]
i=0 j ∈Bi \{i}

= (N + 1)

EG PG [X0 = 1, Xj = 1]I[j ∈ B0 ] .
j =0

In the last line of both derivations we made use of the symmetry of the model.
Invoking symmetry again, we observe that the expectation
EG PG [X0 = 1, Xj = 1]I[j ∈ B0 ]
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in (12) depends only on the number of 1’s in the strategy profile j , denoted s
below. Let us write Ys for the indicator that the strategy profile js , where the first
s players play 1, and all the other players play 0, is a PNE. Also, write Is for the
indicator that this strategy is in B0 (note that Is is a function of the graph only).
Using this notation, we obtain
n 

(13)

EG [b2 (G)] = 2n
s=1



n
EG Is PG [Y0 = 1, Ys = 1]
s

and
−n

n 

EG [b1 (G)] = 2

(14)

s=0

L EMMA 2.4.



n
EG [Is ].
s

EG [b1 (G)] and EG [b2 (G)] are bounded as follows:
n 

EG [b1 (G)] ≤ R(n, p) :=
s=0
n 

EG [b2 (G)] ≤ S(n, p) :=
s=1





n −n
2 min 1, n(1 − p)s−1 ,
s





n −n 
2
1 + (1 − p)s n−s − 1 − (1 − p)s n−s .
s

P ROOF. We begin with the study of EG [b1 (G)]. Clearly, it suffices to bound
E[Is ] by n(1 − p)s−1 , for s > 0. For the strategy profile js to belong in B0 it must
be that there is at least one player who is not connected to any player in the set
S := {1, 2, . . . , s}. The probability that a specific player k is not connected to any
player in S is either (1 − p)s or (1 − p)s−1 , depending on whether k ∈ S; so it is
always at most (1 − p)s−1 . By a union bound it follows that the probability there
is at least one player not connected to S is at most n(1 − p)s−1 .
We now analyze EG [Is PG [Y0 = 1, Ys = 1]]. Recall from the previous paragraph
that Is = 1 only when there exists a player k who is not connected to any player
in S. If there exists such a player k with the extra property that k ∈ S, then PG [Y0 =
1, Ys = 1] = 0, since it cannot be that both 0 and 1 are best responses for player k
when all her neighbors play 0.
Therefore the only contribution to EG [Is PG [Y0 = 1, Ys = 1]] is from the event
every player in S is connected to at least one other player in S. Conditioning on this
event, in order for Is = 1 it must be that at least one of the players in S c := V \ S
is not adjacent to any player in S.
Let us define ps := PG [ ∃ isolated node in the subgraph induced by S], and let
t denote the number of players in S c , which are not connected to any player in S.
Since every player outside S is nonadjacent to any player in S with probability
(1 − p)s , the probability that exactly t players are not adjacent to S is





n−s−t
n−s
[(1 − p)s ]t 1 − (1 − p)s
.
t
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Moreover, conditioning on the event that exactly t players in S c are not adjacent
to any player in S, we have that the probability that Y0 = 1 and Ys = 1 is
1 1
1
.
t
n−t
n−t
2 2
2
Putting these together we obtain
EG Is PG [Y0 = 1, Ys = 1]
n−s 

= ps
t=1




n−s−t 1 1
n−s
[(1 − p)s ]t 1 − (1 − p)s
t
2t 4n−t


n−s 
n−s 
ps 
= n 2(1 − p)s + 1 − (1 − p)s
− 1 − (1 − p)s
4
n−s 
n−s 
ps 
= n 1 + (1 − p)s
− 1 − (1 − p)s
;
4

therefore
n

−n

EG [b2 (G)] =

 

2
s=1


n−s 
n−s
n
ps 1 + (1 − p)s
− 1 − (1 − p)s
s

≤ S(n, p).



In the Appendix we show the following.
L EMMA 2.5.
S(n, p) ≤ O(n−ε/4 ) + exp(−(n))
and
R(n, p) ≤ O(n−ε/4 ) + exp(−(n)).
Given the above bounds on EG [b1 (G)] and EG [b2 (G)], Markov’s inequality
implies that with probability at least 1 − n−ε/8 − 2−n over the selection of the
graph G from G(n, p) we have
(15)

max(b1 (G), b2 (G)) ≤ O(n−ε/8 ) + exp(−(n)).

Let us condition on the event that condition (15) holds. Under this event, Lemma 2.1 implies that




Z − W ≤ 2 b1 (G) + b2 (G) ≤ O(n−ε/8 ) + exp(−(n))
as needed. Noting that 1 − n−ε/8 − 2−n ≥ 1 − 2n−ε/8 , we obtain
(16)

PG [ Z − W ≤ O(n−ε/8 ) + exp(−(n))] ≥ 1 − 2n−ε/8 .
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Using the pessimistic upper bound of 2 on the total variation distance when
condition (15) fails, we obtain
Z − W ≤ O(n−ε/8 ) + exp(−(n)).
Taking the limit of the above bound as n → +∞ we obtain our asymptotic result.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.9. 
2.2. Medium connectivity.
P ROOF OF T HEOREM 1.10. Recall the matching pennies game from Definition 1.17. It is not hard to see that this game does not have a PNE. Hence, if a
graphical game contains two players who are connected to each other, are isolated
from all the other players and play matching pennies against each other, then the
graphical game will have no PNE. The existence of such a witness for the nonexistence of PNE is precisely what we use to establish our result. In particular, we
show that with high probability a random game sampled from D(n,p) will contain
an isolated edge between two players playing a matching pennies game.
We use the following exposure argument. Label the vertices of the graph with
the integers in [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Set 1 = [n] and perform the following operations, which iteratively define the sets of vertices i , i ≥ 2. If | i | ≤ n/2, for some
i ≥ 2, stop the process and do not proceed to iteration i 5 :
• Let j be the minimal value such that j ∈ i .
• If j is adjacent to more than one vertex or to none, let i+1 = i \ ({j } ∪ N (j )).
Go to the next iteration.
• Otherwise, let j  be the unique neighbor of j . If j  has a neighbor = j , let


i+1 = i \ ({j, j } ∪ N (j )). Go to the next iteration.
• Otherwise check if the players j and j  play a matching pennies game.6 If this
is the case, declare N O NASH. Let i+1 = i \ {j, j  }. Go to the next iteration.
Observe that the number of vertices removed at some iteration of the process
can be upper bounded (formally, it is stochastically dominated) by
2 + Bin(n, p),
where Bin(n, p) is a random variable distributed according to the binomial distribution with n trials and success probability p. This follows from the fact that the
vertices removed at some iteration of the process are either the examined vertex j
and j ’s neighbors [the number of those is stochastically dominated by a Bin(n, p)
5 Throughout the process

i represents the set of vertices that could be adjacent to an isolated edge,
given the information available to the process at the beginning of iteration i.
6 More precisely, check if the best response tables of the players j and j  are the same with the
best response tables of the players a and b of the matching pennies game from Definition 1.17 (up to
permutations of the players’ names).
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random variable], or—if j has a single neighbor j  —the removed vertices are j ,
j  and the neighbors of j  [the number of those is also stochastically dominated by
a Bin(n, p) random variable]. Letting m := 0.02n/(np + 1), the probability that
the process runs for at most m iterations is bounded by
Pr[2m + Bin(mn, p) ≥ n/2] ≤ exp(−(n)).
Condition on the information known to the exposure process up until the beginning of iteration i, and assume that | i | > n/2. Let j be the vertex with the
smallest value in i . Now reveal all the neighbors of j , and if j has only one
neighbor j  reveal also the neighbors of j  . The probability that j is adjacent to
a node j  who has no other neighbors is at least n2 p(1 − p)2n =: piso ; note that
we made use of the condition | i | > n/2 in this calculation. Conditioning on this
event, the probability (over the selection of the payoff tables) that j and j  play
a matching pennies game is 18 =: pmp . Hence, the probability of outputting N O
NASH in iteration i is at least 18 12 np(1 − p)2n =: pimp .
The probability that the game has a PNE is upper bounded by the probability
that the process described above does not return N O NASH, at any point through
its completion. To upper bound the latter probability, let us imagine the following
alternative process:
1. Stage 1: Toss n coins independently at random with head probability piso . Let
I1 , I2 , . . . , In ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 represents “heads,” and 0 represents “tails,” be
the outcomes of these coin tosses.
2. Stage 2: Toss n coins independently at random with head probability pmp . Let
M1 , M2 , . . . , Mn ∈ {0, 1}, be the outcomes of these coin tosses.
3. Stage 3: Run through the exposure process in the following way. At each iteration i:
• conditioning on the information available to the exposure process at the beginning of the iteration, compute the probability pj that the vertex j corresponding to the smallest number in i is adjacent to an isolated edge; given
the discussion above it must be that pj ≥ piso ;
• if Ii = 1, then create an isolated edge connecting the player j to a random
vertex j  ∈ i \ {j }, forbidding all other edges from j or j  to any other
player, and make the players j and j  play a matching pennies game if Mi =
1; if they do output N O NASH;
• if Ii = 0, then sample the neighborhood of j from the following modified
model:
pj −piso
– with probability 1−p
, create an isolated edge connecting the player j
iso

to a random vertex j ∈ i \ {j }, forbidding all other edges from j or j  to
any other player, and make the players j and j  play a matching pennies
game with probability pmp ; if both of these happen, output N O NASH;
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– with the remaining probability, sample the neighborhood of j and the
neighborhood of the potential unique neighbor j  from G(n, p), conditioning on j not being adjacent to an isolated edge.
• Define i+1 from i appropriately, and exit the process if | i+1 | ≤ n/2.
It is clear that the process given above can be coupled with the process defined
earlierto exhibit the same behavior. But it is easier to analyze. In particular, letting
S := m
i=1 Ii Mi , the probability that a Nash equilibrium does not exist can be
lower bounded as follows:


process runs for at
PG [ ∃ a PNE] ≥ Pr S ≥ 1 ∧
least m steps


≥ Pr[S ≥ 1] − Pr



process runs for
less than m steps



≥ 1 − (1 − pimp )m − exp(−(n)).
Hence, the probability that a PNE exists can be upper bounded by


1
exp(−(n)) + 1 − np(1 − p)2n
16


m



≤ exp(−(n)) + exp − mnp(1 − p)2n








≤ exp − mnp(1 − p)2n .
For p ≤ 1/n the last expression is
exp(−(n2 p)),
while for p = g(n)/n where g(n) ≥ 1 the expression is


















exp − n(1 − p)2n = exp − ne−2g(n) = exp − eloge (n)−2g(n) .
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.10. 
2.3. Low connectivity.
P ROOF OF T HEOREM 1.11. Note that if the graphical game is comprised of
isolated edges that are not matching pennies games, then a PNE exists. (This can be
checked easily by enumerating all best response tables for a 2 × 2 game.) We wish
to lower bound the probability of this event. To do this, it is convenient to sample
the graphical game
in two stages as follows: at the first stage we decide for each of

the possible n2 edges whether the edge is present (with probability p) and whether
it is predisposed to be a matching pennies game (independently with probability
1/8); by “predisposed” we mean that the edge will be set to be a matching pennies
game if the edge turns out to be isolated. At the second stage, we do the following:
for an edge that is both isolated and predisposed, we assign random payoff tables to
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its endpoints conditioning on the resulting game being a matching pennies game;
for an isolated edge that is not predisposed, we assign random payoff tables to its
endpoints conditioning on the resulting game not being a matching pennies game;
finally, for any node that is part of a connected component with 0 or at least 2
edges we assign random payoff tables to the node. The probability that there is no
edge in the first stage that is both present and predisposed is
n

(1 − p/8)(2) .
Conditioning on this event, all present edges are not predisposed. Note also that,
when c is fixed, the probability that there exists a pair of adjacent edges is o(1). It
follows that the probability that all present edges are not predisposed and no pair
of edges intersect can be lower bounded as


n
c
(1 − p/8)(2) − o(1) = 1 − 2
8n

n(n−1)/2

− o(1).

But, as explained above if all edges are isolated and none of them is a matching
pennies game a PNE exists. Hence, the probability that a PNE exists is at least


c
1− 2
8n

n(n−1)/2

− o(1) −→ e−c/16 .



3. Deterministic graphs.
3.1. A sufficient condition for existence of equilibria: Strong connectivity.
P ROOF OF T HEOREM 1.13. We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 1.9, except that we make the slight modification of setting N := 2n − 1. Recall
that Xi , i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, is the indicator random variable of the event that the
strategy profile encoded by the number i is a PNE. It is rather straightforward (see
the proof of Theorem 1.9) to show that
N−1

E[Z] = E

Xi = 1.
i=0

As in the proof of Theorem 1.9, to establish our result, it suffices to bound the
following quantities:
N−1

b1 (G) =

P[Xi = 1]P[Xj = 1],
i=0 j ∈Bi
N−1

b2 (G) =

P[Xi = 1, Xj = 1],
i=0 j ∈Bi \{i}
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where the neighborhoods of dependence Bi are defined as in Lemma 2.2. For S ⊆
{1, . . . , n}, denote by i(S) the strategy profile in which the players of the set S play
1 and the players not in S play 0. Then writing 1(j ∈ B) for the indicator of the
event that j ∈ B we have
N−1

b2 (G) =

P[Xi = 1, Xj = 1]
i=0 j ∈Bi \{i}
N−1

P[Xi = 1, Xj = 1]1(j ∈ Bi )

=
i=0 j =i

=N

P[X0 = 1, Xj = 1]1(j ∈ B0 )

(by symmetry)

j =0
n

=N









P X0 = 1, Xi(S) = 1 1 i(S) ∈ B0 .
k=1 S,|S|=k

We will bound the sum above by bounding
δn

(17)

P X0 = 1, Xi(S) = 1 1 i(S) ∈ B0

N
k=1 S,|S|=k

and
n

(18)



P X0 = 1, Xi(S) = 1 1 i(S) ∈ B0

N



k=δn+1 S,|S|=k

separately.
Note that if some set S satisfies |S| ≤ δn, then |N (S)| ≥ α|S| since the graph
has (α, δ)-expansion. Moreover, each vertex (player) of the set N (S) is playing
its best response to the strategies of its neighbors in both profiles 0 and i(S) with
probability 14 , since its environment is different in the two profiles. On the other
hand, each player not in that set is in best response in both profiles 0 and i(S) with
probability at most 12 . Hence, we can bound (17) by
δn

P X0 = 1, Xi(S) = 1

N
k=1 S,|S|=k

 n−αk  αk
1
1

δn

≤N
k=1 S,|S|=k



< 1+

 α n

1
2

2

4

− 1 ≤ en−ε .

δn 

=
k=1

n
k

  αk
1

2
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To bound the second term, notice that, if some set S satisfies |S| ≥ δn + 1, then
since the graph has (α, δ)-expansion N (S) ≡ V , and, therefore, the environment
of every player is different in the two profiles 0 and i(S). Hence, 1(i(S) ∈ B0 ) = 0.
By combining the above we get that
b2 (G) ≤ en−ε .
It remains to bound the expression b1 (G). We have
b1 (G) − 2−n =

N−1

P[Xi = 1]P[Xj = 1]
i=0 j ∈Bi \{i}
N−1

P[Xi = 1]P[Xj = 1]1(j ∈ Bi )

=
i=0 j =i

= 2−n

1(j ∈ B0 )
j =0

−n

δn



1 i(s) ∈ B0

=2



k=1 S,|S|=k

+ 2−n

n





1 i(s) ∈ B0 .
k=δn+1 S,|S|=k

The second term is zero as before. For all large enough n the first summation
contains at most 2n/2 terms and is therefore bounded by 2−n/2 . It follows that
b1 (G) + b2 (G) ≤ en−ε + 2−n/2 .
An application of the result by Arratia, Goldstein and Gordon [4] concludes the
proof of Theorem 1.13. 
3.2. A sufficient condition for the nonexistence of equilibria: Indifferent matching pennies. In this section we provide a proof of Theorem 1.16. Recall that an
edge of a graph is called d-bounded if both adjacent vertices have degrees smaller
or equal to d. Theorem 1.16 specifies that any graph with many such edges is
unlikely to have PNE. We proceed to the proof of the claim.
P ROOF OF T HEOREM 1.16. Consider a d-bounded edge in a game connecting two players a and b; suppose that each of these players interacts with d − 1
(or fewer) other players denoted by a1 , a2 , . . . , ad−1 and b1 , b2 , . . . , bd−1 .7 Recall
that if a and b play an indifferent matching pennies game against each other then
7 We allow these lists to share players.
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the game has no PNE. The key observation is that a d-bounded edge is an indif2d−2
ferent matching pennies game with probability at least ( 18 )2
=: pimp —since a
random two-player game is a matching pennies game with probability 18 , and there
are at most 22d−2 possible pure strategy profiles for the players a1 , a2 , . . . , ad−1 ,
b1 , b2 , . . . , bd−1 ; for each of these pure strategy profiles the game between a and
b must be a matching pennies game.
For a collection of m vertex disjoint edges, observe that the events that each of
them is an indifferent matching pennies game are independent. Hence, the probability that the game has a PNE is upper bounded by the probability that none of
these edges is an indifferent matching pennies game, which is upper bounded by


 1 22d−2 

(1 − pimp )m ≤ exp(−mpimp ) = exp −m

8

.

For the second claim of the theorem note that, if there are m d-bounded edges,
then there must be at least m/(2d) vertex disjoint d-bounded edges.
The algorithmic statement follows from the fact that we may find all nodes with
degree ≤d in time O(n2 ), and then find all edges joining two such nodes in another
O(n2 ) time, with the use of the appropriate data structures; these edges are the dbounded edges of the graph. Then in time O(m2d+2 ) we can check if the endpoints
of any such edge play an indifferent matching pennies game.
The final claim of the theorem has a similar proof where now the potential
witnesses for the nonexistence of a PNE are the edges in E . 
Many random graphical games on deterministic graphs such as players arranged
on a line, grid, or any other bounded degree graph [with ω(1) edges] are special
cases of the above theorem and hence are unlikely to have PNE asymptotically.
APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS
P ROOF OF L EMMA 2.5.
We begin with S.

We need to bound the functions S(n, p) and R(n, p).

Bounding S. Recall that
n 

S(n, p) :=
s=1



n−s 
n−s
n −n 
2
1 + (1 − p)s
− 1 − (1 − p)s
.
s

We split the range of the summation into four regions and bound the sum over each
region separately. We begin by choosing α = α(ε) as follows:
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ε 20
(i) if ε ≤ 1790
105 , we choose α = ( 2+ε ) ;
ε
(ii) if ε > 1790
105 , we choose α = 2+ε .

Given our choice of α = α(ε) we define the following regions in the range of s
(where—depending on ε—Regions I and/or III may be empty and Region IV may
have overlap with Region II):
ε
};
I. {s ∈ N|1 ≤ s < (2+ε)p
ε
II. {s ∈ N| (2+ε)p ≤ s < αn};
1
III. {s ∈ N|αn ≤ s < 2+ε
n};
1
IV. {s ∈ N| 2+ε n ≤ s < n}.

We then write
S(n, p) ≤ SI (n, p) + SII (n, p) + SIII (n, p) + SIV (n, p),
where SI (n, p) denotes the sum over region I etc., and bound each term separately.
Region I. The following lemma will be useful.
L EMMA A.1.

For all ε > 0, p ∈ (0, 1) and s such that 1 ≤ s <
(1 − p)s ≤ 1 −

P ROOF.

First note that, for all k ≥ 1,


(19)



(2 + 0.5ε)sp
.
2+ε




s
s
p2k+2 ≤
p2k+1 .
2k + 2
2k + 1

To verify the latter note that it is equivalent to
s ≤ 2k + 1 +
ε
which is true since s ≤ (2+ε)p
=
Using (19), it follows that

1
(2/ε+1)p

2k + 2
,
p

≤ p1 .

 

(20)

(1 − p)s ≤ 1 −

 

s
s
p+
p2 .
1
2

Note finally that
0.5ε
s(s − 1) 2
sp >
p ,
2+ε
2

ε
(2+ε)p ,
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which applied to (20) gives
(1 − p)s ≤ 1 −

(2 + 0.5ε)sp
.
2+ε



Assuming that Region I is nonempty and applying Lemma A.1 we get
 

SI (n, p) ≤
s<ε/((2+ε)p)

≤
s<ε/((2+ε)p)

≤
s<ε/((2+ε)p)

≤
s<ε/((2+ε)p)

≤
s<ε/((2+ε)p)

n−s
n −n 
2 1 + (1 − p)s
s

 



 



(1 + 0.25ε)sp
n −s
2
1−
s
2+ε

 



 







(1 + 0.25ε)sp
n −s
2 exp −
n
s
2+ε




 
s<ε/((2+ε)p)



n −s
2 exp −(1 + 0.25ε) loge (n)s
s


(1 + 0.25ε)ε
× exp
s
(2 + ε)2
s −s −(1+0.25ε)s

≤

n2 n
s<ε/((2+ε)p)

 √ s
e





1
exp s
2

n−0.25εs
2
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
 √ s
e
≤
n−0.25ε
2
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
 √ s
e
−0.25ε
≤n
2
s<2ε/((2+ε)p)
√


e
−0.25ε
= O(n
)
since
<1 .
2
≤

n−s

(1 + 0.25ε)sp
n −s
(n − s)
2 exp −
s
2+ε

(1 + 0.25ε)sp
s
× exp
2+ε

≤

n−s

(2 + 0.5ε)sp
n −n
2
1+1−
s
2+ε
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Region II. We have

 

n
n −n 
2 1 + (1 − p)s
s

SII (n, p) ≤
ε/((2+ε)p)≤s<αn

 

n −n
2 (1 + e−ps )n
s

≤
ε/((2+ε)p)≤s<αn



≤
ε/((2+ε)p)≤s<αn

(21)
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≤ αn

n
αn






n
n
2−n 1 + e−pε/((2+ε)p)
αn

1 + e−ε/(2+ε)
2

n



≤ αn2

nH (α)

1 + e−ε/(2+ε)
(n + 1)
2


≤ αn(n + 1) 2H (α) ·

n

1 + e−ε/(2+ε)
2

n

.

In the above derivation H (·) represents the entropy function, and for the second to
last derivation we used the fact that
 

n
≤ (n + 1)2nH (k/n) .
k

(22)

Our definition of the function α = α(ε) guarantees that when ε ≤




H (α)

2
while when ε >

1790
105

1 + e−ε/(2+ε)
·
≤ 0.999,
2

1790
105





H (α)

2

1 + e−ε/(2+ε)
·
≤ 0.99.
2

Using the above and (21) we obtain
SII (n, p) = exp(−(n)).

(23)

Region III. Let us assume that the region is nonempty. We show that each
positive term in the summation SIII (n, p) is exponentially small. Since there are
O(n) terms in the summation, it follows then that SIII (n, p) is exponentially small:
 

n
n −n 
2 1 + (1 − p)s
s
 

(24)

≤

 

n −n
n −n
2 (1 + e−ps )n ≤
2 (1 + e−pαn )n
s
s
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≤

n
n −n 
2 1 + e−(2+ε)α loge (n)
s

 



n

 



n(2+ε)α n1−(2+ε)α

1
n −n
=
2
1 + (2+ε)α
s
n
1
n −n
=
2
1 + (2+ε)α
s
n
 

≤

n −n n1−(2+ε)α
2 e
s

≤ (n + 1)2nH (s/n) 2−n en

1−(2+ε)α

≤ (n + 1)2nH (1/(2+ε)) 2−n en

1−(2+ε)α
1−(2+ε)α

= (n + 1)2n(H (1/(2+ε))−1) en

,

where in the third-to-last line of the derivation we employed the bound of (22).
Notice that the right-hand side of (24), seen as a function of ε > 0 and α > 0, is
c 20
decreasing in both. Since ε > c, our choice of α = α(ε) implies that α > ( c+2
) .
Hence, we can bound the right-hand side of (24) as follows:
1−(2+c)(c/(c+2))20

(n + 1)2−n(1−H (1/(2+c))) en
= exp(−(n)),

1−(2+c)(c/(c+2))20

where we used the fact that c is a constant, and therefore the factor en
is sub-exponential in n, while the factor 2−n(1−H (1/(2+c))) is exponentially small
in n.
Region IV. Note that, if xk ≤ 1, then by the mean value theorem
(1 + x)k − (1 − x)k ≤ 2x

max

1−1/k≤y≤1+1/k

ky k−1

= 2kx(1 + 1/k)k−1
≤ 2ekx.
We can apply this for k = n − s and x = (1 − p)s since
(n − s)(1 − p)s ≤ (n − s)e−ps
≤ (n − s)e−(2+ε) loge (n)/n(n/(2+ε))
n−s
≤
n
≤ 1.
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Hence, SIV (n, p) is bounded as follows:

 

n −n
2 2e(n − s)(1 − p)s
s

SIV (n, p) ≤
n/(2+ε)≤s≤n

 

≤ 2e · 2−n · n
n/(2+ε)≤s≤n

−n

≤ 2e · 2




n
(1 − p)s
s

n

· n 1 + (1 − p)

p
≤ 2en 1 −
2

n

≤ 2ene−p/2n
≤ 2ene−(2+ε) loge (n)/(2n)n
≤ 2enn−(2+ε)/2
≤ 2en−ε/2 .
Putting everything together. Combining the above we get that
S(n, p) ≤ O(n−ε/4 ) + exp(−(n)).
Bounding R. Observe that
−n

R(n, p) = 2

n 

+
s=1





n −n
2 min 1, n(1 − p)s−1 .
s

We bound R as follows:
R(n, p) − 2−n
n 

≤
s=1






n −n
2 min 1, n exp −p(s − 1)
s
 

−n

n
s

≤2

1≤s≤n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)

 

+ 2−n
s>n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)

≤ 2−n



n
n exp −p(s − 1)
s

(n + 1)2nH (s/n)
1≤s≤n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)
−n

+2

s>n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)

 



n
n exp −p(s − 1)
s
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≤ n(n + 1)2−n 2nH ((3+ε)/(6+3ε))
 

−n

+2

s>n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)



n
n exp −p(s − 1)
s
 

−n

≤ exp(−(n)) + 2

s>n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)



n
n exp −p(s − 1) ,
s

where in the last line of the derivation we used that ε > c > 0 for some absolute
constant c. To bound the last sum we observe that when s > n(3+ε)
6+3ε we have






(2 + ε) loge (n) n(3 + ε)
−1
n exp −p(s − 1) ≤ n exp −
n
6 + 3ε


(2 + ε) loge (n)
≤ n · n−(2+ε)(3+ε)/(6+3ε) · exp
n




≤ n−ε/3 · n2/n · nε/n = O(n−ε/4 ).
Using this bound and the fact

n
n
s=0 s = 2

n

concludes the proof. 
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